Educational Considerations
Volume 4

Number 2

Article 6

9-1-1976

Why philosophy for children?
Darrell R. Shepard
Washburn University

Follow this and additional works at: https://newprairiepress.org/edconsiderations
Part of the Higher Education Commons

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 4.0
License.
Recommended Citation
Shepard, Darrell R. (1977) "Why philosophy for children?," Educational Considerations: Vol. 4: No. 2.
https://doi.org/10.4148/0146-9282.2042

This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by New Prairie Press. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Educational Considerations by an authorized administrator of New Prairie Press. For more information,
please contact cads@k-state.edu.

Shepard: Why philosophy for children?

This author thinks philosophers can learn from
philosophy for children which attempts to
recapture the spirit of the Socratic dialogue.
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" Philosophy for children" catches the imagination as
much as "Torn Swift: Boy President." But while there may
be few arguments ·for the latte r, there are some very
powerful arguments for the former.
But first let us be very clear what we mean by
philosphy for children . We may mean dealing with
philosophical questions; or w e may mean dealing with
questions philosophically-In a d ialogical, critical and
cumulative search for answers and awareness of alter·
natives. We would seldom mean dealing with the pronouncements of philosophers as such. While the child could un·
doubtedly be trained to spew back such pronounce·
ments, I am at a loss why we should want him to do so.
We should also be very clear that philosophy already
permeates our child's curriculum-sometimes by its
presence, sometimes by its absence. Social studies, now
understood simply as the study of man, must deal with the
question "What is man?" by answering It or by ignoring it.
More obviously, moral education has always had a place in
the curriculum. The valueless classroom has never
existed. The issue is not whether philosophy shall have a
place in the curriculum, but whether the hidden
curriculum will become the open curriculum, whether we
can do it better by doing it consciously.
Let us then consider some reasons for doing it consciously.
Surely it is obvious that II Johnny can't reason,
Johnny can't read. Reading without understanding defies
analogy. But, understanding requires grasping fun·
damental logical relationships and the development of
Imaginatio
n . It
is a source of continual amazement that
educators who have been so suspicious in recent years of
the transference value of foreign languages for Engli~h
and of psychology for social development still trust to
transference when it comes to reasoning . "If we teach the
child to reason mathematically, scientifically, creatively,
etc., then the child doesn' t need to think about thinking."
It Is Interesting to note that in a recent field test of a
phi losophy for children curricu lum , sharp increases in
reading scores occurred.
It is also an obvious pedagogical point that one
begins any instruction where the s tudent is and with the
questions the student Is asking. Many of the questions
asked by children are philosophical questions dealing
with issues such as justice, death , where the world came
from, etc. To ignore these questions. hoping they will go
away, diminishes either the child's respect for himself, or
for the school, or both. To treat these questions haphazardly is sophistry and violates the integrity of both the child
and the teaching profession. It Is dubious whether the
child need recognize his questions as "philosophical,"
but because such questions require special handling. it is
essential that they be recognized as " phi losophical" by
parents and by teachers.
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Today we bemoan the sense of anomie and
meaningl essness which is seen in students and teachers
alike. While lhe observations of sociologists regarding the
frag mented nature of society may contribute lo lhe
pathology seen in lhe schools, it is hardly the whole story.
ildren,
Ch
as
The curriculum Itself may be partly to blame.
their art reveal s, have a very comprehensive point of view.
They seek c onnections- meanings. Contrast this propen·
sity o l the child wit
h the curriculum which is divided into
unconn ec ted segments. When Dewey spo ke of
ph ilosophy as the method of education, he may·have had
in mind logic which g ives structure to the various
discipl
ines, or he may have had in mind the integrating
nature of philosophy which Charles
felt Sidgwick
was so
important. Or, Dew ey may have been reflecting upon the
fact that each of the discip
lines rests upon phi losophical
presuppositio ns which, among other things, establi sh the
point of the d iscipline.
If our worry with meaninglessness is in the larger sense,
that of the meaning o f life, the curric
ulum
is still of little help to the chi ld. Meaning in this sense still requires
connections which the chi ld has little practice in maki ng.
Moreover, If the connections are made for the child, we
are indoctrinati ng rather that educati ng. As Matthew Lipman has noted, these meanings must be discovered by
the child for himself. But where is he to look? What opportunities does the curriculum afford the child for such
d iscovery? It Is also interesting that schools which have
established
reasoning programs have seen
ophical philos
a heightening of enthusiasm and a decrease in dro pouts.
Even before Watergate, parents, educators and em·
ployers w ere c oncerned with the value crisis. Into the gap
stepped moral education, now mandated in several states.
Students have had their values clarified or thei r develop·
ment from theoretical s tage encouraged . But as eth ics,
normally thought of as a part of philosophy, has been
presented as a separate part of the curriculum in a
package empty of philosophical content, the problem has
intensified and psychological harm has often occurred.
Students are now pronounced as being at Stage 4 or Stage
5 who still cannot distinguish between an " ought" and
an " is." indeed, it is extremely dubious pedagogy to o ffer
such courses as separate ingredients in the curriculum,
thereby indirec tly suggesting that ethical dilemmas come
into ou r lives with signs hung around their necks read ing
" Alert! I am an ethical d ilemma." Effective moral
education can only take p lace when the moral dimensions
of problems are probed on the home territory of the
problem in question.
Because moral education has become a part of the
curriculum even in states where it is not mandated, the
issue of indoctrination has arisen as it has not since
separation o f church and state was guaranteed by the
Constitution. WhOse values will be taught, teacher's.•
parent's, society's or Kant's? Many have seen philosophy
for children as the best protection against indoc trination
whether it be In the area of value theory, political theory o r
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mathematic al theory. This is because phi losophy Is o ften
charac terized as a search for and an awareness of aller·
natives. Furthermore, the recognition that X is a logical
ernati
wi
alt
ve
ll not allow us easily to d isregard or to
demean the person who beli eves X. In other words, the
search for alternatives may simultaneously promote
respect for persons.
Perhaps we ·ph ilosophers have much to learn from
phi losophy for children which often attempts to recapture
the sp irit of the Socratic dialogue and to inculcate the
virtue of thinking for oneself. The dialogue, as amply
illustrated in the Meno, builds-is cumulative-with logic
as its struc ture. How d ifferent fro m the bull-sessions in
· which we and our students participate- " Now let me tell
you what happened to me !" As the dialogue builds, the
questioner becomes the one who is questioned, and ail
parties assume responsibility for the co nclusions which
they draw.
Again, the questions dealt with In the Socratic
dialogues were as o ften acidressed to Socrates as by
Socrates. They were questions in the minds of hi s
questioners. Thi s, perhaps, also speaks of the
pedagogical relevance of philosophy for children for
philosophy begins with thoughts which all children have.
Not every child has had the experience of grandfather's
farm to share with his classmates, bu t every child does
have his own idea of what is fair and his own idea of his
own thoughts. The real ization o f this ever so fundamental
level of commonality has prompted claims to be made for
philosophy for child ren as a builder o f camaraderie and
respect within the school as well as the promoter of the
ideal learning environ ment where all partici pate as equals.
But suppose we s tep back from all these arg uments
for a moment and attempt an his torical survey of the
curriculum. Is it not the case that our curriculum has
become more and more specific, particularized? Compare
a reader of today with a McGuffey Reader. Today college
entrance examinations testify to the inability of the you ng
adult to generalize property or to handle abstrac tions. Our
conclusion must be that they have been trained, but not
educated-able to handle situations in which they have
found themse
sl
ve before, but unable to handle situations
st ightly or greatly divergent although related by princi pies.
Our answer to th is inability has been anything but
pedagogically sound.• but it has been self-fulfilling. We
have further particularized and · specialized instruction,
catering instead of challenging. Sure eno ugh, o ur efforts
have been vindicated. Abstractions and generalizations
are hard and all of our efforts at specialization and particularization have not succeeded in devetoping ·the abil it
y
to abstract or to generalize property.
To the·extent that philosophy is that discipline which
fosters this ability to generalize, to assume responsibility
for one's decisions, to connec t ideas which otherwise
remain unconnected, to respect the ideas o f others and to
understand, the case for phi losophy for children has been
made.
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